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Mainstream economics posits the economy as a disembedded sphere generally governed 
by its own rules and principles. In reality, the economy is comprised of social relations, 
and conflicting interests configure those relationships. As a result, our political economy 
is  the  outcome  of  that  conflict,  a  reconciliation  between  democracy  and  capitalism, 
variously termed democratic capitalism, embedded liberalism, or the welfare state.  
  Any reconciliation though is temporary, and democratic capitalism, as it has 
existed since World  War II,  has  managed  a number  of  attempts to resolve  conflicts 
between labor and capital.1 Wolfgang Streeck (2011, p. 7), in his recent New Left Review 
article, describes democratic capitalism 
…as a political economy ruled by two conflicting principles, or regimes, of 
resource allocation: one operating according to marginal productivity, or what 
is revealed as merit by a ‘free play of market forces’, and the other based on 
social need or entitlement, as certified by the collective choices of democratic 
politics. Under democratic capitalism, governments are theoretically required 
to  honour  both  principles  simultaneously,  although  substantively  the  two 
almost never align.  
 
This  ongoing  tension  is  what  Streeck  calls  the  ‘normal  condition’  of  democratic 
capitalism. More importantly, crises are the byproducts of these reconciliation efforts. 
Therefore, crises are also the ‘normal condition’ of capitalism. 
   A brief and simplified outline of past resolutions is helpful, and what follows is 
borrowed from Streeck. The organized working classes first accepted capitalist markets 
and property rights in exchange for political democracy that included social security and 
a rising standard of living in the growth period following World War II. The welfare state 
provided labor with the right to collectively bargain, allowing them to negotiate a higher 
wage. By also guaranteeing full employment, in keeping with the Keynesian model then 
adopted,  the  state  leveraged  labor’s  bargaining  power.  As  growth  began  to  stall,  the 
government  continued  to  protect  employment,  with  rising  inflation  as  a  byproduct. 
Inflation  and  stalled  growth  resulted  in  the  stagflation  of  the  1970s.  The  Reagan Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 5 (2012) 
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administration  targeted  inflation  by  sharply  raising  interest  rates.  Increasing 
unemployment resulted and was made more feasible politically by breaking union power. 
However, inflation and unemployment put more demands on the state to provide social 
benefits,  including  fulfilling  the  promises  (social  entitlements)  made  in  previous 
negotiations  with  labor,  that  had  exchanged  wage  moderation  for  unemployment 
insurance, social security, and the like. Public debt was the byproduct this time. As that 
too became untenable, for political and economic reasons, the proposed solution was the 
deregulation of financial markets.2 This led to an increase in private debt as financial firms 
found ever new ways to offer credit. They amplified the money supply for this credit 
through complicated processes of securitization. However, deregulation accompanied by 
an ever-riskier use of securitization and derivatives resulted in the financial crisis of 2008 
and its accompanying fallout. To prevent another Great Depression, states spent money, 
once again contributing to a large public deficit.  
  As Streeck notes, every compromise lasts only so long. In fact, Streeck goes so 
far as to argue that any “lasting reconciliation between social and economic stability in 
capitalist democracies is a utopian project” (2011, p. 24). In periods of stability, the 
anomaly rather than the rule, reconciliation appears feasible and lasting. That is why each 
crisis comes as such a shock. Despite the regular and increasing appearance of crises, 
theorists, whether economists, political scientists, or sociologists, continue to argue that 
reconciliation  is  possible.  Those  that  ignore  the  tension  between  capitalism  and 
democracy  are  even  more  in  the  dark.  Gabriel  Almond,  a  former  president  of  the 
American  Political  Science  Association,  believed  in  reconciliation.  In  an  interesting 
lecture that reviewed the relationship between capitalism and democracy, asking whether 
one supported or subverted the  other,  Almond pointed to evidence that democracy 
supported capitalism through the very tension that needed resolving. He argued that 
social  demands  on  the  market  economy  produced  a  form  of  democratic  welfare 
capitalism that prevented capitalism’s demise. Other theorists, usually of a more Marxist 
persuasion, have made similar arguments. In essence, capitalism is reformed by adopting 
and adapting to its critique. Almond (1991, p. 474) claimed that 
[d]emocratic welfare capitalism produces that reconciliation of opposing and 
complementary  elements  which  makes  possible  the  survival,  even 
enhancements  of  both  of  these  sets  of  institutions.  It  is  not  a  static 
accommodation, but rather one which fluctuates over time, with capitalism 
being compromised by the tax-transfer-regulatory action of the state at one 
point, and then correcting in the direction of the reduction of the intervention 
of the state at another point, and with a learning process over time that may 
reduce the amplitude of the curves. 
 
Almond’s  portrayal  of  democratic  capitalism’s  reconciliation  is  akin  to  mainstream Reconciliation or Bust?, Chaves
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economist’s description of the business cycle. There are fluctuations, growth spurts and 
recessions, but the cycle, as our policy tools improve, can be managed and smoothed out.  
Barry Eichengreen  makes a similar claim for  a  lasting reconciliation in  his 
analysis of the international monetary system. In his book, Globalizing Capital, he asks 
whether Karl Polanyi’s (2001) basic thesis stands the test of time: 
Can the international monetary history of the second half of the twentieth 
century  be  understood  as  the  further  unfolding  of  Polanyian  dynamics,  in 
which democratization again came into conflict with economic liberalization 
in the form of free capital mobility and fixed exchange rates? Or do recent 
trends  toward  floating  rates  and  monetary  unification  point  to  ways  of 
reconciling freedom and stability in the two domains? (Eichengreen, 2008, p. 
3) 
 
Eichengreen concludes that the flexibility and stability of floating exchange rates and 
monetary unification as seen in the Eurozone may feasibly offer such a reconciliation. 
The  recent  crisis  and  its  magnitude,  not  to  mention  the  potential  implosion  of  the 
Eurozone, highlight the naiveté of such arguments.  
  However,  our  attempts  to  respond  to  the  current  crisis  demonstrate  the 
continued  faith  in  reconciliation.  Many  believe  that  this  crisis,  which  they  name  a 
financial  crisis,  can  be  wholly  blamed  on  the  greed  of  Wall  Street  and  financial 
liberalization.3  They  then  believe  that  it  can  be  resolved  through  greater  financial 
regulation. But how lasting will this reconciliation be, even if it is politically feasible? As 
Streeck  argues, the  arenas  of distributional conflict have become  more remote from 
popular politics as more and more political power appears ‘privatized’. Movements like 
Occupy Wall Street are an understandable response to the resulting democratic deficits. 
The necessary question becomes whether sufficient political power can be returned to 
the public within today’s capitalist economy. 
 
    
Notes Notes Notes Notes 
 
1 These competing tensions predate World War II and are fruitfully explored in Karl 
Polanyi’s The Great Transformation (2001). 
2 What makes public debt untenable, or when is public debt too large, is a contentious 
question.  Those  economists  and  politicians  who  try  to  simplify  it  by  calling  for 
balanced  budgets  may  mask  certain  interests  served  by  such  claims.  The  better 
question to ask then is who gains and who loses when public debt grows. 
3 As Chris Harman wrote, “[m]ajor economic crises almost invariably involve crashes of Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 5 (2012) 
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banks and other financial institutions as well as the bankruptcy of productive firms and 
rising unemployment for workers. It is easy then for people to misunderstand what is 
happening and to blame finance, the banks or money for the crisis, rather than the 
capitalist  basis  of  production”  (2010,  p.  67).  These  simple  conclusions,  Harman 
argued, produce simple solutions, i.e., that the way to prevent future crises is through 
greater regulation of finance.        
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